












This paper develops a theoretical framework to understand mechanisms
behind the rise and fall of class societies. The dynamics is described by the joint
evolution of the wage rate, the vertical division of labor between employers and
workers, and the distribution of household wealth. The model is simple enough to
allow for a complete characterization of the steady states.
For some parameter values, the model predicts the rise of class societies,
where the households are permanently separated into the two classes in any steady
state.  The rich bourgeoisie maintain a high level of wealth due to the presence of
the poor proletariat, which has no choice but to work at a wage rate strictly lower
than the “fair” value of labor.  For other parameter values, the model predicts the
fall of class societies, where job creation by the rich employers pushes up the
wage rate so much that the workers will escape from the poverty and eventually
catch up with the rich.  Thus, the wealth created by the rich trickles down to the
poor, and, in the steady state, the inequality disappears.
As an application, this framework is used to study the effects of self-
employment, which provides the poor with an alternative to working for the rich,
and at the same time, provides the rich with an alternative to the job creating
investment, which could benefit the poor.
JEL Classification Numbers: D31(Personal Income and Wealth Distribution);
O11(Macroeconomic Analysis of Economic Development)
Keywords: Imperfect Credit Markets, Distribution of Wealth, The Vertical
Division of Labor, Endogenous Formation/Dissolution of Class Societies,
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1. Introduction
The division of labor between the employers and workers is one of the most contentious
issues in social sciences.  Some believe that the employers get rich because of cheap labor
provided by the workers, who have no choice but to work for them.  According to this view, the
relation between the two is antagonistic. Many socialists argue that, in a capitalist society, this
vertical division of labor will develop into the class structure. One class, the bourgeoisie, owns
and controls the means of production and exploits the other, the proletariat, characterized by their
lack of property and dependence on the sale of their labor power to the dominant class.  Marx
and his followers even predicted that the class struggle is an inevitable feature of capitalism and
argued that the only way of realizing a classless society is the appropriation by society as a whole
of the means of production. At the other end of the political spectrum, it is believed that the
employers create jobs, which offer the only hope for the workers to escape the misery of poverty.
According to this view, the relation between the two is mutually beneficial.  Some conservatives
argue that, if the market forces are allowed to operate fully, wealth generated by the rich will
eventually trickle down to the poor, which will eliminate the class distinction, leading to general
prosperity.  Throughout the 19th century and early 20th century, the Marxist view had received
wide political support among industrial workers.  It seems fair to say that, by the late 20th
century, the Marxist view, at least in its original form, has lost much of its intellectual appeal, as
the class distinction has become less pronounced in most advanced economies. Nevertheless,
there exist significant disagreements as to whether the emergence of predominantly middle class
societies has been achieved by the market forces, as many conservatives argue, or by the safety
net provided by social programs in the form of welfare capitalism, as many socialists argue.
Perhaps surprisingly to many outside of economics, very little formal work has been done
within economics to address the issues raised above.  Of course, the division of labor is a central
problem of labor economics, but most formal models are concerned with the horizontal division
of labor, such as occupational choices and job assignments.  Radical economists, such as Marglin
(1984), have developed political economy models of classes, but they take the class structure
exogenously given.  In short, there have been little attempts to model an endogenous formation
and/or dissolution of class societies in a capitalist economy.Class  Societies
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This paper develops a formal framework for investigating the effects of the employer-
worker relation on the rise and fall of class societies in a systematic manner.  In the model
economy, there is a stationary population of inherently identical households, each of which
consists of an infinite sequence of agents connected via intergenerational transfers. At any point
in time, the inherited wealth is the only possible source of heterogeneity across households.  In
the basic model, each agent has two options; becoming an employer or a worker. The key
features of the model are; i) a minimum level of investment is needed to become an employer, ii)
because of the credit market imperfection, any household faces a borrowing limit, iii) the
borrowing limit is higher when their investment is more profitable, iv) the employers need to hire
labor, which means that their investment is more profitable when the wage is lower. These
features jointly imply that the agents who inherited relatively large wealth become employers and
those who inherited relatively little become workers.
2  The threshold level of inherited wealth,
which divides the poor workers from the rich employers, depends on the equilibrium wage and
adjusts endogenously to keep the balance between the supply of and demand for labor.  The
vertical division of labor excludes the relatively poor from being employers and earning as much
as the relatively rich.
In this framework, the distribution of wealth in one generation affects the supply of and
demand for labor, which in turn affects the wage rate and profit, and hence the distribution of
wealth in the next generation. The equilibrium is thus described by the joint evolution of the
wage rate, of the vertical division of labor between employers and workers, and of the
distribution of household wealth. The model is simple enough to allow for a complete
characterization of the steady states for the full set of parameter values.
Under some configurations of the parameter values, the model predicts the rise of class
societies.  That is to say, the household’s wealth is concentrated in two points in all the steady
states.  In other words, the population is permanently polarized into the rich bourgeoisie and the
poor proletariat.  In these steady states, the proletariat possesses little wealth, thereby being
excluded from becoming employers. They have no choice but to work for the rich bourgeoisie at
                                                                       
2See Evans and Jovanovic (1989) for the evidence that the borrowing constraint is the major barrier for the agents
with low net worth from being entrepreneurs. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) also showed that large
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a wage rate strictly lower than the “fair” value of labor, which further contributes to their
pauperization. The rich bourgeoisie maintain a high level of wealth, not only because they can
finance their profitable investment, but also because they have access to the cheap labor supplied
by the proletariat.  Furthermore, there is a lower bound to the fraction of the households that
belong to each class, and it is independent of the initial distribution of wealth.  In other words,
even if there was perfect equality at the beginning, there is inequality of wealth across the
households in the steady state. The model thus explains how the market interactions lead to an
endogenous formation of the class structure.  It offers some theoretical justifications for the left-
wing view that the rich employers owe their high level of wealth to a reserve army of the working
class and that the class conflict is an inevitable feature of capitalism.
This is not, however, the only possible long run outcome of the model.  Under different
configurations of the parameter values, the model predicts the fall of class societies. That is to
say, there is the unique steady state, in which all the household’s wealth converges to the same
level, which is high enough to allow anyone to be an employer.  In this steady state, workers are
paid the “fair” value of labor to make them willing to work for others; otherwise, they would
prefer being employers. This outcome occurs when the demand for labor by the rich employers
pushes up the wage rate so much that the workers, benefiting from a higher wage rate, eventually
catch up with the rich.  In other words, the job creation by the employers helps the workers
escape from the poverty, thereby eliminating inequality in the long run.  This case thus provides
some theoretical justifications for the trickle-down economics preached by the right-wing
conservatives, i.e., accumulation of the wealth by the rich is beneficial for the society as a whole,
including the poor.
Demonstrating the possibility of these two alternative scenarios is important enough,
providing justifications for the two opposing views of the world.  More importantly, the model is
simple enough that it is possible to derive the sufficient and necessary conditions for each of the
two cases in terms of a few key parameters.  The framework can thus be used as an organization
principle or intuition-building device, on these highly contentious issues.
As an application, the present framework will later be extended to introduce a self-
employment technology.  Self-employment provides the poor with an alternative to working forClass  Societies
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the rich.  Therefore, one might think that self-employment would prevent the rise of class
societies.  However, self-employment also provides the rich with an alternative to the job-
creating project, which could benefit the poor. Therefore, one might think that self-employment
would interrupt the trickle-down process, thereby preventing the fall of class societies.  Indeed,
due to this dual nature, the effects of self-employment are quite subtle and more complicated
than one might think at first.  Nevertheless, within the present framework, it is possible to
provide a complete characterization of the steady states with self-employment.  It turns out that,
for most cases, the steady states discussed earlier survive the introduction of the self-employment
technology.  Self-employment may also create some new types of steady states.  For example,
self-employment sometimes creates the poverty trap, in which the entire population suffers from
a lower level of wealth.  There are a few cases, in which self-employment changes the nature of
the dynamics drastically, eliminating the steady states discussed earlier.  For example, in one
case, self-employment facilitates the fall of class societies, helping wealth to trickle down from
the rich to the poor, and yet, its role is only transitory in that self-employment will disappear in
the long run.
The present work may be viewed as a contribution to the literature on long run
distribution of household wealth.
3  Among them, the vertical division of labor plays a central role
in the models of Banerjee and Newman (1993), Freeman (1996), Mookherjee and Ray (2000,
2002) and Galor and Moav (2002).
4  The present work was initially inspired by Banerjee-
Newman, who studied the joint evolution of wealth distribution and institutional transformation.
One crucial difference is that, in the Banerjee-Newman model, the threshold levels of wealth
needed for the investment are free parameters in their model.
5  This feature of their model leads
                                                                       
3As such, it differs in its objective from the vast literature that studies the effects of distribution on growth, surveyed
by Bénabou (1996) and Bertola (1999).
4Other studies in this literature include Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), and
Matsuyama (2000). The employer-worker relation does not play any essential role in these studies.
5There are other important differences. In the Banerjee-Newman model, each investment is subject to an
idiosyncratic shock, which introduces social mobility even in the steady state.  (Here, there is no exogenous shock,
and there is no social mobility in the steady state.)  Furthermore, there are two types of investment, self-employment
and large-scale factory operation.  (Here, there is only one, although an extension in section 4 allows for two.)  While
these features of their model have advantage of enabling them to tell a rich story of institutional transformation, the
resulting model is so complicated that they had to restrict their analysis to a few sets of parameter values.  This
makes it impossible to see how the prediction of their model may change with the parameters. One major advantageClass  Societies
5
to a plethora of steady states.  In particular, they found a set of parameter values that generates
the co-existence of steady states with different degrees of wealth inequality.  Their main message
is history dependence; the distribution of wealth and the dominant institutional form that will
prevail in the long run depend on the initial distribution of wealth.  If it is unequal, the economy
develops a large-scale factory system, whose survival depends on the presence of a large reserve
army of poor workers.
6  If it is equal, the economy becomes a nation of self-employed workers.
The main message here, on the other hand, is not history dependence. In the present model, the
threshold level of wealth adjusts endogenously to keep the labor market in equilibrium.  This
feature of the model imposes tighter restrictions on the steady states.  For some parameter values,
the model predicts endogenous inequality (i.e., the steady state distribution displays inequality,
even though the initial distribution may be equal) and, for other parameter values, the model
predicts trickle-down phenomena (i.e., the steady state distribution displays equality, even though
the initial distribution may be unequal). The other authors have developed models designed to
generate a particular long run prediction.  The models of Freeman and of Mookherjee-Ray both
predict endogenous inequality.  In other words, their contribution is to identify sufficient
conditions for the rise of class societies. Galor-Moav tell a story behind (i.e., identify sufficient
conditions for) the fall of class societies. The present work follows a different approach. It is to
develop a framework that is rich enough to allow for both the rise and fall of class societies and
yet simple enough to allow for the characterization of the sufficient and necessary conditions for
each of the two cases. This in turn allows us to examine the effects of self-employment on the
rise and the fall of class societies.
7
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
of the present framework is that it is simple enough that a characterization of the steady states can be done for the
full set of parameter values, and that the exact conditions for different outcomes can be derived explicitly.
6More precisely, what is needed for this outcome is not the inequality of the initial distribution per se, but the initial
co-existence of the households that are so poor to be self-employed and of the households that are rich enough to
invest a large-factory system.
7Mention should be made of the relation between Matsuyama (2000) and the present study.  Both demonstrate the
possibility of endogenous inequality (all the steady states are characterized by some inequality, even though the
initial distribution may be equal) as well as the possibility of trickle-down phenomena (the steady state is
characterized by equality, even though the initial distribution may be unequal.)  In Matsuyama (2000), the agents
interact through the supply of and demand for credit.  The credit market equilibrium requires that the interest rate
adjusts in such a way that the relatively poor become lenders while the relatively rich become borrowers.  Here, the
agents interact through the labor market, and the wage rate adjusts in such a way that the relatively poor become
workers, while the relatively rich become employers.  The present study not only demonstrates the robustness of the
insights given in Matsuyama (2000).  Because of its focus on the labor market, the present framework obviates theClass  Societies
6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, and
derives the conditions for the labor market equilibrium and for the joint evolution of the wage
rate, of the division of labor and of the distribution of wealth.  Section 3 offers a complete
characterization of the steady states and identifies the sufficient and necessary conditions for the
rise and fall of class societies.  The next two sections discuss some extensions.  Section 4
introduces self-employment.  Section 5 allows the rich to set up multiple firms.  Section 6
concludes.
2. The Model.
Time is discrete and extends to infinity. The economy produces a single numeraire good,
which can either be consumed or invested. In any period the economy is populated by a unit mass
of identical agents.  Each agent is active for one period as a head of an infinitely-lived household
(or dynasty).  The only possible source of heterogeneity across households is their wealth. At the
beginning of each period, the agents receive certain amounts of the numeraire good in the form
of a bequest from the immediate predecessors (or parents).  Let Gt(w) denote the share of the
households, whose agents inherited less than (but not equal to) w at the beginning of period t.
At the beginning of each period, the active agents choose their occupations as well as the
allocation of their inherited wealth in order to maximize their end-of-the period wealth.  (They
make their consumption and inheritance decisions at the end of the period.)  They have two
options; being the worker or the employer.  (A third option, self-employment is added later in
section 4.)  Each worker supplies one unit of labor at the competitive wage rate, equal to vt.
When the agents become workers, they also lend their inherited wealth in the competitive credit
market and earn the exogenously determined gross return equal to r per unit.
8  Thus, by becoming
a worker, the agent who inherited wt will have vt + rwt at the end of period t.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
need for imposing the credit market equilibrium, so that one can assume that the interest rate is exogenously fixed
(say, the credit market may be integrated to the international capital market).  It turns out that the exogeneity of the
interest rate, as well as the additional structure imposed by the production, makes the characterization of the steady
states much simpler here than in Matsuyama (2000).  This in turn enables us to offer a complete analysis of the
effects of self-employment. Further discussion on the similarities and differences between the two will be provided in
section 5.
8One may think that the agents can hold the financial claims issued by financial institutions that have access to the
world interest rate.  Alternatively, one may think that there is a simple storage technology that generates the returnClass  Societies
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Second, the agent may set up a firm and become an employer. Setting up a firm requires F
units of the numeraire good to be invested at the beginning of the period.  This would enable an
agent to employ nt units of labor at the competitive wage rate, vt, and produce (nt) units of the
numeraire good, which becomes available at the end of the period.  The production function
satisfies (n) > 0, (n) > 0 and (n) < 0 for all n > 0, as well as () =  and () = 0.  The
equilibrium level of employment per firm can be expressed as a decreasing function of the wage
rate, n(vt), which is defined implicitly by (n(vt))  vt  and satisfies n(0) = .  The gross profit
from running a firm can be expressed as t = (vt)  (n(vt))  vtn(vt) > 0, which satisfies (vt) =
n(vt) < 0 and (vt) = n(vt) > 0, and (0) = () =  .  It is assumed that each employer can
set up and manage at most one firm and that being an employer prevents the agent from earning
the wage as a worker.  These assumptions are, however, solely for simplicity, and will be
dropped later in section 5.
When the inherited wealth falls short of the investment required (i.e., wt < F), the agent
needs to borrow by bt  = F  wt in the competitive credit market at the gross interest rate equal to
r, in order to become an employer.  If the inherited wealth exceeds the investment required, the
agent can become an employer and lend by wt  F at the rate equal to r.  In any case, the agent
who inherited wt will have (vt) + r(wt  F) at the end of period t by becoming an employer.  This
is greater than or equal to vt + rwt (the end-of-the-period wealth if the agent becomes a worker),
if and only if
(1) (vt)  vt  rF, or equivalently, vt 	 V,
where V > 0 as a unique solution to (V)  V = rF, and may also be expressed as V = V(rF), a
decreasing function satisfying V() = 0.   We shall call (1) the profitability constraint.  If vt < V,
all agents prefer being employers to being workers.  If vt = V, they are indifferent.  If vt > V, then
the wage is too high for the investment to be profitable; the agents are better off being workers
instead of being employers. One may also call V the “fair” value of labor in the two different
senses of the word.  First, no agent, given the choice, would be willing to work at a wage rate
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
equal to r.  This interpretation, however, would require an additional restriction on the parameter values so that the
aggregate investment in storage is positive.Class  Societies
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lower than V.  Second, it is the wage rate which would equalize the net earnings of the employers
and of the workers.
The credit market is competitive in the sense that both lenders and borrowers take the rate
of return, r, given.  It is not competitive, however, in the sense that one cannot borrow any
amount at this rate.  The borrowing limit exists because the borrower/employer can pledge only
up to a fraction of the profit for the repayment.  More specifically, the borrower/employer is
unable to credibly commit to repay more than 
(vt), where 0 	 
 	 1.
9  Knowing this, the
lenders would allow a would-be employer to borrow only up to its discounted value, 
(vt)/r.
Thus, the agent can set up a firm and become an employer only if
(2) wt  C(vt)  Max{0, F  
(vt)/r},
where C(vt) is the critical level of the household wealth needed for the agent to become an
employer, and, when positive, it is an increasing, concave function of the wage rate.  One may
also interpret C(vt) as the collateral requirement imposed by the lenders. Since C(v) = 0 when v is
close to zero, the borrowing constraint is not binding when the wage rate is sufficiently low.
10
We shall call (2) the borrowing constraint.  It is assumed that the same commitment problem
rules out the possibility that different agents may pool their wealth to overcome the borrowing
constraint.
The agents become employers if and only if both the profitability and borrowing
constraints, (1) and (2), are satisfied. If one of these constraints fails, they become workers.  The
parameter, 
, captures the credit market friction in a parsimonious way.  If it is equal to zero, the
agents are never able to borrow and hence must self-finance the fixed cost entirely.  If it is equal
to one, the borrowing constraint is never binding if (1) holds, i.e., whenever the agents want to
borrow.  By setting it between zero and one, this specification allows us to examine the whole
range of intermediate cases between the two extremes.  The reader may thus want to interpret this
                                                                       
9The specification here follows Matsuyama (2000, 2001a, 2001b).
10This is due to the assumption, () = , which implies (0) = .  Without this assumption, (0) would be finite
and, for rF > (0), C(0) > 0, which implies that there exists a trivial steady state, where every household’s wealth is
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formulation simply as a black box, a convenient way of introducing the credit market frictions in
a dynamic model, without worrying about the underlying causes of the frictions.
11
We can now describe the labor market equilibrium.  If vt > V, (1) fails; it is not profitable
to set up a firm.  Hence, no agent would become an employer and every agent would become a
worker; there would be an excess supply of labor.  Thus, vt 	 V must hold in equilibrium.  The
agents who inherited less than C(vt) violates (2); they cannot finance their investment and have
no choice but to become workers. The agents who inherited more than or equal to C(vt) can and
want to become employers and hire n(vt) each, if vt < V, and they are willing to do so, if vt = V.













; vt 	 V,
where the first inequality can be strict either when Gt jumps at C(vt) or when vt = V.  Equation
(3) is illustrated in Figure 1. The downward-sloping curve shows the labor demand per firm.  The
other curve can be interpreted as the labor supply per firm.  Note that the supply curve is drawn
flat at vt = V, to capture the fact that all the agents are indifferent between being employers and
being employees.
12  If vt < V, all the agents prefer to be employers. As long as Gt(C(vt)) > 0,
however, the labor supply does not go to zero, because the borrowing constraint prevents some
agents from being employers.  In this range, this curve is generally upward-sloping, because a
higher wage rate means a lower profit.  This lowers the borrowing limit and the agents need to
come up with more for the collateral.  Therefore, more agents are unable to set a firm, and they
have no choice but to work.  The supply curve can be flat at vt < V, as indicated by the dashed
line.  This occurs when a positive measure of the agents inherited C(vt), so that Gt() jumps at
                                                                       
11Nevertheless, it is possible to give any number of moral hazard stories to justify the assumption that the borrowers
can pledge only up to a fraction of the profit.  The simplest story would be that the borrower may strategically
default, whenever the repayment obligation exceeds the default cost.  The default cost is proportional to the profit
because the creditor may seize a fraction  of the profit in the event of default or because this fraction of the profit
will be dissipated in the borrower’s attempt to default.  (These two alternative interpretations of the default cost
would make no difference, because the default does not occur in equilibrium.)  Alternatively, following Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), one could assume that each firm is specific to the borrower, and requires his own services to earn
(vt).  Without his services, it earns only (vt).  Then, the borrower, by threatening to withdraw his services, can
renegotiate the repayment obligation down to (vt).
12Figure 1 depicts the situation where Gt(C(V)) < 1.  If Gt(C(vt)) = 1 for some vt < V, then the labor supply curve
stays strictly below the line, vt = V.  If Gt(C(vt)) < 1 for all vt < V, and Gt(C(V)) = 1, then the labor supply curve is
asymptotic to the line, vt = V.Class  Societies
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C(vt).   If the labor demand curve intersects with an upward sloping part of the labor supply
curve, as depicted in Figure 1, all the agents borrow up to the credit limit.  If they intersect at a
flat part of the labor supply curve with vt < V, some agents must be credit-rationed, meaning that
they cannot borrow up to the limit, even though they want to do so and they are equally qualified
as others.
13 This introduces an element of chances in the dynamics of the household wealth.  To
deal with this situation, one needs to specify a rationing rule, which is inevitably ad-hoc. The
following analysis and discussion ignores such a possibility of equilibrium credit rationing,
because this situation never arises in the steady state.  (Also, the steady states are independent of
any rationing rule assumed.)
To summarize,
Proposition 1.
i)  If vt < V, all the rich agents, who inherited C(vt) or more, become employers.  All the poor
agents, who inherited less than C(vt), become workers.  The poor workers earn vt, which is
lower than (vt)  rF, the net earning of the rich employers.
ii)  If vt = V, some rich agents, whose inherited C(V) or more, become employers.  All the poor
agents, who inherited less than C(V), becomes workers.  All the households receive the same
level of the net earning.
To close the model, the bequest rule of the agents must be specified.  To keep the matter
simple, let us assume that the agent maximizes ut = (1)log ct  + log wt+1, where ct is the
agent’s consumption.
 14  Then, each agent leaves  fraction of the end-of-the period wealth to the
                                                                       
13While some authors use the term, “credit-rationing,” whenever some borrowing limits exist, here it is used to
describe the situation that the aggregate supply of credit falls short of the aggregate demand, so that some borrowers
cannot borrow up to their borrowing limit.  In other words, there is no credit rationing if every borrower can borrow
up to its limit.  In such a situation, their borrowing is constraint by their wealth, which affects the borrowing limit,
but not because they are credit-rationed. This use of terminology is also consistent with the following definition by
Freixas and Rochet (1997, Ch.5), who attributed it to Baltensperger: “some borrower’s demand for credit is turned
down, even if this borrower is willing to pay all the price and nonprice elements of the loan contract.”
14Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), Matsuyama
(2000) and many others in the literature adopted this specification, which assumes that the donor’s utility depends on
the amount given.  The alternative specification, which assumes that the donor’s utility depends on the utility of the
beneficiary, not only has implications that have been rejected empirically (see, for example, Altonji, Hayashi, and
Kotlikoff 1997); it would also lead to significant complications without much additional insights.  The Cobb-Class  Societies
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next generation (sibling).  The wealth of each household thus changes according to the following
dynamics:
(vt + rwt) if  wt < C(vt),
(4)  wt+1 =
  ((vt)  rF + rwt)i f  w t  C(vt).
We impose the restriction,  < 1/r, to ensure the existence of the steady states.
Figure 2 illustrates (4).  The solid line graphs the map for the case where vt < V, or
equivalently, (vt)  rF > vt.  The map is linear and has a constant slope equal to r  (0, 1),
except that it jumps up at C(vt). Although all the agents want to be employers, the agents from
the poor households, whose wealth falls short of C(vt), have no choice but to work for the agents
from rich households.  The arrows indicate the effects of a rise in the wage rate.  A higher wage
rate means that the terms-of-trade is more favorable for the poor worker and less favorable for
the rich employer.  Hence, with a high wage, the poor would have more wealth in the next
period, while the rich would have less wealth in the next period (though it is still larger than the
poor’s.)  A higher wage rate also makes the threshold higher, because the investment is less
profitable, which reduces the borrowing limit, and as a result, would-be employers need to
contribute more in the form of a down payment.  This suggests that a high wage rate is good for
the very poor household, which cannot borrow to become an employer in any case.  It is bad for
the middle class households, which could finance their investment at a lower wage rate (meaning
the prospect of a higher profit), but not at a higher wage rate.  Finally, the dashed line, wt+1 =
(V+rwt), depicts the dynamics when vt = V.  In this case, all the households earn V, regardless
of whether they are workers or employers.
This completes the description of the model.  Once a wealth distribution in period t is
given, (3) determines the equilibrium wage rate, and the occupational choice of the agents.  Then,
from (4), one can calculate the wealth distribution in period t+1.  By repeating this process, the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Douglas preferences matter only to the extent that it makes the bequest a linear function of the end-of-the-period
wealth, which simplifies the algebra.  The homotheticity is not essential.  Indeed, it is straightforward to allow for
Stone-Geary preferences, so that the rich leave a large fraction of their wealth.  Such an extension may be desirable
to capture the point made by Kalecki, Kaldor and others that aggregate wealth accumulation is done mostly by the
capitalist.  It also helps to make the model more realistic in that most households own little wealth in reality.Class  Societies
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model can be used to examine the joint evolution of the wage rate, the wealth distribution, and
the division of the society between the employers and workers.
3. The Steady State Analysis
Let us now look at the behavior of the economy in the long run.  The steady state is associated
with the limit distribution, G(w), and the limit wage rate, v.  It is the state, which replicates
itself over time, once the economy is settled in, and where all the households hold a constant
level of wealth.
3A. The Classless Society: The Steady State with Wealth Equality
First, suppose that the wealth distribution is degenerate in a steady state.  This is possible
only when all the households earn the same net income, and hence v  = V.  From (4), this
implies that the household’s steady state wealth is given by the fixed point of the map, wt+1 =
(V+rwt), or
(5)       w = V/(1r)  C(V).
As long as the inequality in (5) is satisfied, there exists a steady state, in which all the households
maintain the same level of wealth and are rich enough to be able to become employers.
Furthermore, all the households, whether they are workers or employers, earn the same net
income, so that they are indifferent, and the labor market equilibrium condition, (3), is satisfied
with vt = v  = V.  (Note that G(C(V)) = 0, because it is the share of the household whose wealth
is less than but not equal to C(V).)  Therefore, (5) is the sufficient and necessary condition for the
existence of a steady state, in which the wealth distribution is degenerate.
3B. The Class Society: The Steady States with Wealth Inequality
Consider now steady states with an unequal distribution of wealth.  That is, some
households belong to the entrepreneurial class or bourgeoisie; they are rich enough to become
entrepreneurs and employers.  The others belong to the working class or proletariat; they are
poor and have no choice but to work.  The existence of persistent inequality requires v < V.  InClass  Societies
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such a steady state, the wealth of all the households in the bourgeoisie must converge to the fixed
point of the map, wt+1 = ((v)  rF + rwt) or
(6) w
B
 = B(v)  ((v)  rF)/(1r)  C(v),
where the inequality in (6) is the condition that these households are indeed rich enough to be
able to finance their investment.  (B stands for “bourgeoisie”.)  Next, the wealth of all the




 = P(v)  v/(1r) < C(v),
where the inequality in (7) is the condition that these households are indeed too poor to be able to
finance their investment, and hence has no choice but to work.  (P stands for “poor” or
“proletariat”.)  Note that the above argument also establishes that the wealth of the households is
concentrated on two points in a steady state with inequality.
The labor market equilibrium condition, (3), becomes X/(1X) = n(v), where 0 < X
< 1 is the steady state fraction of the working class.  Note that, for any v < V, this condition can
be satisfied by setting
(8) X = X(v)  n(v)/(1+n(v))  (0, 1).
Therefore, the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of a two-point steady state
distribution is given by the inequalities in (6) and (7), which are reproduced as follows:
(9) P(v) < C(v)	 B(v).
3C. The Full Characterization of the Steady States.
We have just established that there are only two kinds of the steady states, and derived the
conditions for their existence, (5) and (9).  Figure 3a-c help to illustrate these conditions.  The
straight line with the slope equal to /(1r) depicts the steady state wealth of the proletariat,
P(v), while the convex, downward-sloping curve depicts that of the bourgeoisie, B(v), both as
functions of v.  The wealth gap between the two classes, B(v)  P(v), shrinks as v goes up,
and would disappear at v = V, where P(V) = B(V) = V/(1r).  The third curve, the concave,
upward-sloping one, depicts F  
(v)/r, which is equal to C(v), when it is positive.  There areClass  Societies
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only three generic ways in which this curve may intersect with P(v) and B(v).  In Figure 3a, it
intersects with P(v) at v
  > 0 and with B(v) at v
+ < V.  In Figure 3b, it intersects twice with
P(v), first at v
 > 0 and then at v
+ < V, and it stays below B(v) for all v < V.  In Figure 3c, it
never intersects with P(v) nor with B(v); it stays below P(v) for all v < V.
In Figure 3a, the steady state with perfect equality does not exist, because P(V) = B(V) =
V/(1r) < C(V) = F  
(V)/r, which violates (5). In both Figure 3b and Figure 3c, on the
other hand, (5) holds, and hence there exists a steady state, in which wealth distribution is
degenerate at w = V/(1r)  C(V) = Max {0, F  
(V)/r}.
In Figure 3a,  P(v) < C(v) 	 B(v) over (v
 , v
+], where 0 < v
 < v
+ < V.  Thus, (9) holds
for v  (v
 , v
+].  This means that there is a continuum of steady states, in which the wage rate is
given by v  (v
 , v
+] and the fraction of the households that belong to the working class is
given by X = X(v)  [X(v
+), X(v
 )), where 0 < X(v
+) < X(v
 ) < 1.   All these steady states are
characterized by a two-point distribution of wealth.  The case of Figure 3b is similar except that
(9) holds for v  (v
 , v
+) and X  (X(v
+), X(v
 )).  In Figure 3c, on the other hand, C(v) <
P(v) < B(v) for all v < V, which means that (9) is never satisfied.  That is, there is no steady
state with a two-point distribution.
Having identified the three cases to be classified, it remains to characterize the conditions
for the three cases, in terms of the parameters of the model, (r, 
, rF)  (0,1)
2(0,), which is
done in Proposition 2.  To state the proposition, it is convenient to introduce some functions.  For
a positive constant, , define






where V() > 0 is the unique solution to (V)  V   and satisfies V() = 0.   The following
lemma summarizes the key properties of these functions.
Lemma.Class  Societies
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i)   > 0, 0 < () < 1 for   (
+, ), with (
+) = 0 and () = 1, where 
+ is defined uniquely
by 
+ = V(
+) and satisfies 0 < 
+
  < ;








c = (c) = 
1(c) is defined uniquely by 
= 
cn(V((
c))) = (c)n(V(c)), and satisfies 0 < 
c < 1 and 
+ < c <  .
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma is illustrated in Figure 4.  Note that the two graphs, 
 = () and  = (
), are both
increasing, and the former stays strictly above the latter except at the point of tangency, (
c,
(
c)) = ((c), c).
We are now ready to state the proposition.
Proposition 2.   Let  = r/(1r).  Then,
a)  If 0 < 
 < (rF), (5) does not hold and (9) holds, as shown in Figure 3a.  Hence, there exists a
continuum of steady states, indexed by its wage rate, v  (v
, v
+], where v
 is a unique
solution to P(v) = C(v) in (0,V) and v
+ is a unique solution to B(v) = C(v) in (0,V).  In these
steady states, a fraction X(v) of the household owns P(v) = v/(1r) and a fraction 1
X(v) of the households owns B(v) = ((v)  rF)/(1r), where 0 < X(v
+) 	 X(v) <
X(v
) < 1.
b)  If 
  (rF) and (
) < rF < c, both (5) and (9) hold, as shown in Figure 3b.  Hence, there





are the two solutions to P(v) = C(v) in (0,V).  In these steady states, a fraction X(v) of the
household owns P(v) = v/(1r) and a fraction 1 X(v) of the households owns B(v) =
((v)  rF)/(1r), where 0 < X(v
+) < X(v) < X(v
) < 1.  There exists also a steady state,
in which v = V and all the households maintain the wealth equal to w = V/(1r).
c)  Otherwise, (5) holds and (9) does not hold, as shown in Figure 3c.  Hence, there is a unique
steady state, in which v = V and all the households maintain the wealth equal to w =
V/(1r).Class  Societies
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Proof .  See the appendix.
In Figure 4, Regions A, B, and C satisfy the conditions stated in Proposition 2a), 2b) and 2c),
respectively.  The boundary of A is given by (10), and the boundary between B and C is given by
(11) for  < c. A higher  increases , which shifts both boundaries to the left and upward.
Thus, as  goes up, Region A shrinks and Region C expands.
In Region A, with a combination of a large F and a small 
, the model predicts the rise of
class societies.  In all the steady states, there is a permanent separation between the rich
bourgeoisie and the poor proletariat.  The size of each class is bounded away from zero.
15  The
intuition behind an endogenous formation of class societies should be easy to grasp.  Because of
the large investment requirement and/or the large credit market friction, the wage rate must
become sufficiently low to make it possible for some households to be able to borrow and
become employers.  In order to keep the wage rate low, however, some households must stay
poor, so that they are unable to borrow and forced to work.  In every steady state, the rich
maintain their wealth partly because the poor work for them at a low wage.  And the rich’s
demand for labor is not strong enough to pull the poor out of the poverty.
  Across these steady
states, the degree of inequality differs systematically.  Indeed, the steady state wealth
distributions can be ranked according to the Lorenz criterion.  The Kuznets Ratio, the coefficient
of variation, the Gini coefficient, and any other Lorenz-consistent inequality measure, all agree
that there is greater inequality in a steady state with a lower wage rate.  This is because a lower
v implies not only that B(v) is larger (i.e., the rich are richer), and P(v) is smaller (i.e., the
poor are poorer), but also that X(v) is larger (i.e., a larger fraction of the households is poor).
Again, the intuition behind this result is easy to grasp.  The presence of a large working class
keeps the wage rate low.  A lower wage rate favors the rich at the expense of the poor, which
increases the wealth gap.  A larger demand for labor by each rich employer can be met by only
                                                                       
15The reader may wonder what would happen if the economy starts with a perfectly equal distribution of the wealth,
in Region A.  Suppose that the initial level of wealth is less than C(V).  Then, the labor supply curve is flat below V
and the equilibrium wage rate in the first period is determined in such a way that credit rationing will take place in
equilibrium.  The lucky households obtain credit and accumulate wealth faster than the others that are denied credit.
This breaks the perfect equality.  If the initial level of wealth is greater than or equal to C(V), then, the labor supply
curve is flat at V.  Every household earns the same net income, and over time, their wealth declines until, after a
finite periods, it goes below C(V), at which point, the equilibrium credit rationing occurs, and the equality is broken.Class  Societies
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when a small fraction of the households belongs to the bourgeoisie.  Note that the size of the
firms increases with the inequality.  In a steady state with a lower wage, a smaller fraction of the
households belongs to the bourgeoisie, and each of them employs a larger number of workers
In Region C, with a combination of a small F and a high 
, wealth inequality disappears
in the steady state.  In this case, the model predicts the fall of the class society through a trickle-
down mechanism, in which the job creation by the rich, by raising the wage rate, pulls the poor
out of the poverty, and the poor households will eventually catch up with the rich households. In
other words, the model predicts that the class society disappears in the long run.  In the steady
state, some agents work for others, but they do not mind doing so because they are paid “fair”
value of labor, and those who employ operate relatively at a small scale, hiring a small number of
workers.  In other words, the economy becomes a nation of the middle class, or petits bourgeois,
consisting of small proprietors and well-paid employees.
Although an explicit analysis of the dynamics is beyond the scope of this paper, the
transition process is not difficult to imagine.
16  Suppose that the economy starts at an
underdeveloped state, where all the households are poor.  There is little inequality, but some
households are richer than others.  Initially, the equilibrium wage rate is very low and the profit is
high, so that the relatively rich households, while they may be poor in absolute terms, are able to
borrow and invest.  Their wealth then starts growing faster than others, magnifying inequality.  In
Region A, this leads to a formation of the class society.  In Region C, the rich’s demand for labor
will drive up the wage rate so much that the working class, which benefit from a high wage rate,
will be able to catch up with the rich, reducing inequality.
In Region B, characterized by a combination of a small rF and a small 
, both the long
run scenarios are possible.  Therefore, whether the economy may develop into the class society or
not depends entirely on the initial wealth distribution (and possibly on the credit-rationing rule,
as well.)
It might be instructive to consider the following thought experiment, which arguably
traces the evolution of industrial societies.  Immediately after the Industrial Revolution, 
 was
                                                                       
16An explicit analysis of the dynamics faces two major difficulties. First, the distribution of wealth is an infinite-
dimensional object. Second, to analyze the dynamics for an arbitrary initial condition, one cannot avoid the
possibility of equilibrium credit rationing in transition, which introduces stochastic elements into the models.Class  Societies
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small and F was large, so that the economy was in Region A.  Throughout much of the nineteenth
century and early twentieth century, this led to a formation of the class society in industrial
countries.  Then the capital market and the technology gradually improve over time.  With an
increase in 
 and/or a reduction in F, the economy eventually entered in Region C.  This led to a
formation of the predominantly middle-class society in the late twentieth century.
3D. Ranking of the Steady States.
In Regions A and B, there are multiple steady states, which can be indexed by their levels
of the wage rate, v.   Since a higher v benefits the workers at the expense of the employers, the
steady states are not Pareto-rankable.  However, it is possible to rank them by the total surplus,
TS  Xv + (1X)((v)  rF), or equivalently, by the aggregate wealth, AW  XP(v) +
(1X)B(v) = [/(1r)]TS.  Simple algebra shows that TS = (1X)[n(v)v + (v)  rF]  =
(1X)[(n(v))  rF] = [(n(v))  rF]/(1+n(v)).  Hence, d(TS)/dv = n(v)[(1+n(v))(n(v))
+ rF  (n(v))]/(1+n(v))
2 = n(v)[v + rF  (v)]/(1+n(v))
2, which is positive if v < V and
zero if v = V.  Thus, when there are multiple steady states, the aggregate wealth and the total
surplus is larger in a steady state with a higher v.
This completes the analysis of the basic model.  The next two sections discuss some
extensions.
4. Self-Employment
In the model presented above, the relatively poor agents have no choice but to work for
the relatively rich. Some readers might think that, if the poor have an alternative to working for
the rich, such as self-employment, the model would not predict the rise of class societies.
However, the effects of introducing self-employment are far from straightforward, because self-
employment also offers an alternative for the rich, who would otherwise invest in the job creating
project, which could benefit the poor workers.  This might interrupt the trickle-down process,
and ends up preventing the fall of class societies.
To address this issue in a formal manner, let us now suppose that the agents have a third
option, self-employment. This technology requires F
S units of the numeraire good to be investedClass  Societies
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at the beginning of the period, which gives the agents 
S units of the numeraire good at the end of
the period.  Thus, by becoming self-employed, the agents would have 
S + r(wt  F
S) at the end





Thus, (12) is the condition under which the agents (weakly) prefer being self-employed than
being an worker.
To become self-employed, the agent whose wealth, wt, is less than the necessary
investment, F
S, must borrow the difference, wt  F
S.  As in the case of borrowing to become an
employer, the borrowing limit exists also for the agents who intend to become self-employed.
They could pledge only up to a fraction of the profit, 

S
S, for the repayment, where 0 	 

S < 1.




Thus, the agents can become self-employed only if
(13) wt  C
S  Max{0, F





S may be interpreted as the collateral requirement for the investment in the self-
employment technology.
Needless to say, we need to impose some restrictions on V
S and C
S, the two parameters
that characterize the self-employment technology, so that this technology may provide the poor
agents with a viable alternative to working for others, and yet that it would not provide the rich










The first assumption (A1) implies that, for any vt 	 V, V
S < V = (V)  rF 	 (vt)  rF, so that
being an employer is preferable to self-employment.  Without (A2), the self-employment
technology would never affect the labor market equilibrium.
17  Finally, (A3) ensures the
                                                                       
17To see this, suppose the contrary, C(V
S)  C
S.  Then, vt < V
S would imply C(vt) < C
S.   Thus, whenever self-
employment is more desirable than working for others, any agent who is rich enough to be self-employed is rich
enough to be an employer.Class  Societies
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sustainability of self-employment.  By being self-employed, the households maintain enough
wealth that allows them to satisfy the borrowing constraint for being self-employed.
4A. The Labor Market Equilibrium:
Figure 5 illustrates the labor market equilibrium with self-employment, under the
additional assumptions that C
S > 0 and that Gt has no mass point.  If the self-employment
technology were not available, the labor supply per firm would be equal to Gt(C(vt))/[1 
Gt(C(vt))] for vt < V, which is continuous and has no flat part (because Gt has no mass point).
Introducing self-employment does not affect the curve when vt > V






S > 0.  This is because, when vt > V
S, every agent is better off being a
worker than being self-employed, and when vt < V
0, any agent who can afford to be self-
employed can also afford to be an employer, which is preferable.  Self-employment thus affects




0 < vt < V
S, all the agents strictly prefer being self-employed to being a worker.
With vt > V
0, C(vt) > C
S holds, which means that the agents whose wealth satisfy C
S 	 wt < C(vt)
become self-employed.  The agents whose wealth exceeds C(vt) become employers and those
whose wealth falls short of C
S become workers.  Thus, when V
0 < vt < V
S, the labor supply per
firm is given by Gt(C
S)/[1  Gt(C(vt))].
If vt = V
S, all the agents whose wealth satisfy C
S 	 wt < C(vt) can be self-employed, but
they are indifferent between being self-employed and being employed.  Thus, the labor supply





indicated by the flat segment at vt  = V
S.  If the labor demand curve, n(vt), intersects this part of
the labor supply curve, as shown in Figure 5, some agents who can be self-employed become
workers.  However, this should not be viewed as a credit rationing.  They would voluntarily
become workers, because their net earning is equal to vt = V
S.
Of course, if Gt has one or more mass points (i.e., a positive measure of the agents have
the same level of wealth), an equilibrium credit rationing may occur.  In such a situation, some
agents are denied the credit and unable to become self-employed, despite that they strictly prefer
to be self-employed and that they may be equally qualified for the credit as some self-employedClass  Societies
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agents (for the same reason that was explained in the discussion of Figure 1).  As before,
however, the following analysis and discussion ignore such a possibility of equilibrium credit
rationing, because it never occurs in the steady state.
4B. Dynamics:
The household wealth now follow
(vt + rwt) if  wt < C
S
(14) wt+1 = (V
S + rwt) if  C
S 	 wt < C(vt)
  ((vt)  rF + rwt)i f  w t  C(vt),
if V
0 < vt < V
S.  Otherwise, they follow Equation (4).  Figure 6 illustrates (14).  Now the map
jumps twice, at C
S and at C(vt).  If wt < C
S, the agent becomes a worker, earning vt; if C
S 	 wt <
C(vt), the agent becomes self-employed, earning V
S > vt; if wt  C(vt), the agent becomes an
employer, earning (vt)  rF > V
S.  As before, the arrows indicate the effects of a rise in the wage
rate.  The effects of a higher wage rate on the workers and the employers are the same as before.
As long as vt < V
S, a higher wage rate does not affect the wealth dynamics of self-employed
households, although more agents are forced to become self-employed because a higher wage
rate increases the collateral requirement for the employer, C(vt).
4C. The Classification of the Steady States:
We are now ready to classify the steady states.
The One-Class Steady State without Active Self-Employment: This is the same steady
state discussed in section 3A, with v = V.  Its existence is not affected by the introduction of the
self-employment technology, because v = V > V
S implies that self-employment is a dominated
option.  Therefore, (5) remains the sufficient and necessary condition for its existence.
  The Two-Class Steady States without Active Self-Employment: These are the same steady
states discussed in section 3B, with v < V.  Its existence requires that, in addition to (9),
(15) v 	 V
0, v  V
S, or C
S > P(v),
because the poor households would switch to self-employment, if V
0 < v < V
S and P(v)  C
S
would hold.Class  Societies
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The introduction of the self-employment technology may create the following three new
types of steady states, in which a positive measure of households are self-employed.
The One-Class Steady State with Active Self-Employment: In this steady state, every
household is self-employed, maintaining the wealth equal to P(V
S)  C
S, and the labor market is
inactive.  This occurs when no one is rich enough to be an employer. To induce any self-
employed agent to work for them, potential employers would need to offer a wage rate at least as
high as V
S, but at such a wage rate, no one could borrow enough to be employers, that is, P(V
S) <
C(V




Even though this steady state is characterized by perfect equality, and its wealth distribution is
degenerate, its steady state level of wealth, P(V
S), is strictly less than B(V) = P(V), the level of
wealth achieved by all the households in the steady state discussed in Section 3a.
The Two Class Steady States with Active Self-Employment; In these steady states, the
labor market is active with v = V
S.  The agents are indifferent between being self-employed and
being a worker.  Both the self-employed and the working households own the same level of
wealth, P(V








S).   The shares of the households that become self-employed, workers, and
employers are given by S  (0,1), X(v)(1  S), and (1  X(v))(1  S), respectively, where






These steady states are also characterized by two-point wealth distributions, where a fraction, S
+ X(v)(1  S), of the population owns P(V
S) and the rest owns B(V
S).
The Three Class Steady States; In these steady states, the labor market is active with v 
(V
0, V
S), and the steady state wealth distributions are concentrated at three points, P(v), P(V
S),
and B(v).  The poorest are the proletariat; they are too poor to be self-employed, P(v) < C
S, and
have no choice but to work.  The richest are the bourgeoisie; they are rich enough to become
employers, B(v)  C(v).  The wealth of the self-employed households converges to P(V
S),Class  Societies
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which makes them too poor to be employers, but rich enough to be self-employed, C(v) > P(V
S)
 C
S.  Combining these conditions yields
(18) B(v)  C(v) > P(V
S)  C
S > P(v).
Again, the shares of the households that become self-employed, workers, and employers are
given by S  (0,1), X(v)(1S), and (1X(v))(1S), respectively.
Adding the self-employment technology may create these three new types of the steady
states.
18  Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the last two may indeed be viewed as
variations of the two-class steady states discussed in section 3B.  In both, the rich households
enjoy the high level of wealth, because there are poor households who are willing (or forced to)
work for the rich below the fair wage rate, V.  The one-class steady state with active self-
employment is the only new steady state, in which no household enjoys the high level of wealth
by taking advantage of cheap labor supplied by the poor.  It also differs from the one-class steady
state with v = V in that it prevents the society from developing the mutually beneficial
employer-worker relation, in which all the households could enjoy the level of wealth, B(V) =
P(V), which is higher than P(V
S), the wealth that can be achieved by the self-employment
technology.   In this sense, this steady state may be viewed as a poverty trap, in which there is an
equalization of poverty.
4D. The Full Characterization of the Steady States
Having identified all the types of the steady states and their existence conditions, it
remains to characterize them in terms of the parameters of the model.
In Regions A or B, the cases illustrated in Figures 3a) and 3b), the self-employment could
eliminate some two-class steady states, while creating new ones.  To conduct a systematic
analysis, let us recall first the two critical values, v
 < v
+, defined in Propositions 2a) and 2b),
which are also depicted in Figures 3a) and 3b). Recall also that V
0 was defined by C(V
0) = C
S.  It
is also useful to define V by P(V) = C
S. Then, (A1)-(A3) may now be rewritten as V
0 < V
S < V,
and V 	 V
S.  There still remain the following six generic cases to be distinguished, depending on
                                                                       
18This abundance of the steady states has some resemblance to the results of  Banerjee and Newman (1993) and
Piketty (1997).Class  Societies
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the values of V
S and C






Case I:  V
S < v










































0 < V < v
+ < V
S








+ < V < V
S in Region A
v
 < v
+ < V < V
0 < V
S in Region B.
In each of the six generic cases, we can check to see whether it satisfies the condition for each
type of the steady states, thereby making a complete list of the existing steady states.
In Region C of Figure 4, the case illustrated in Figure 3c), the introduction of the self-
employment technology has no effect in the long run.  The steady state is unique; in which v =
V and the wealth of all the households converges to B(V) = P(V).  Thus, as before, the model
predicts the fall of class societies in this case.  To see why this is the only steady state, note that
all the conditions for the other types of the steady states, from (15) through (19), require that C(v)
exceeds P(v) for some v < V, which is ruled out in the case of Region C, as shown in Figure 3c).
Table 1: The Steady States in the Model with Self-Employment
No Active Self-Employment Active Self-Employment
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, V) V
S  (V, V)
A IIIc  (v
, v
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19Here, V is defined by C(V)  P(V
S).  It always satisfies V < v
+ in the case of A-IIIc.  In the cases of IIb and A-
IIIb, V < V requires that C
S must be sufficiently large within the range; for C
S sufficiently close to P(v
), V 	 V
holds and hence there is no three-class steady state.Class  Societies
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B IIIa V   
B IIIb V (v
, V)  
B IIIc V (v
, v
+)  
CV   
Table 1 offers a complete list of the steady states in this model.  For each parameter
configuration and for each type of the steady states, the table entry shows the range of the steady
state wage rates when they exist (or the value of the steady state wage rate when it exists
uniquely), and  when they do not.  As shown, many of the two-class steady states discussed in
section 3B, which exist in Regions A and B, survive the introduction of the self-employment
technology.  They continue to exist, either because self-employment is no more attractive than
working for others (i.e., v  V
S as in Cases I, IIa, and IIb), or because the workers are too poor
to become self-employed (i.e., v < V or P(v) < C
S, as in Cases IIb, IIIb, and IIIc).  Only the
steady states whose wage rates satisfy V 	 v < V
S are eliminated.  Even then, they are often
replaced by the two-class steady states with active self-employment with v = V
S (as in Cases IIa
and IIb), or by the three-class steady states (as in Cases IIb, and A-IIIb, A-IIIc), both of which can
be viewed as variations of the two-class steady states.
The introduction of the self-employment technology may also create an entirely new type
of the steady state, where every agent is self-employed and the employer-worker relation
disappears altogether.  In Cases IIa and IIb, this steady state, in which every household owns
P(V
S), is dominated by other steady states, including some two-class steady states with v  V
S,
where the rich own B(v) and the poor own P(v)  P(V
S).  In these cases, the one-class steady
state with 100% self-employment should be viewed as a poverty trap, where the investment in
self-employment prevents the economy from accumulating wealth, because, unlike the other
investment, it does not create any job.  In Cases A-IIIb, and A-IIIc, however, the one-class steady
state with 100% self-employment is an improvement for the households that belong to the
proletariat in the other existing steady states.
There is one case, where the introduction of the self-employment technology changes the
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self-employment eliminates all the two-class steady states discussed in section 3B.  In Region A,Class  Societies
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the one-class steady state, where every household is self-employed, becomes the only steady
state.  In Region B, the one-class steady state without active self-employment is left as the only
steady state.  It is noteworthy that, in B-IIIa, the introduction of the self-employment technology
helps to eliminate the class societies, and yet in the long run, no household remains self-
employed.  In other words, self-employment is only transitory, and yet changes the structure of
the steady states.  To understand the intuition behind, suppose that the economy is separated into
the rich and the poor and then the self-employment technology is introduced.  This technology
provides the poor with an alternative not only profitable but also affordable.  As a result, they
would stop working for the rich at the low wage, which leads to the fall of class societies. Once
the economy starts accumulating wealth through the self-employment technology, the households
become sufficiently rich that they could profitably become employers, even they have to pay their
workers the wage rate high enough to make them give up being self-employed, at which point
self-employment stops being used.  In short, self-employment plays only a historic role in the fall
of class societies.
Finally, in Region C, the long run prediction of the model is not at all affected by the
introduction of the self-employment.
5. Constant Returns to Scale (with the Minimum Investment)
We have assumed that each agent can set up and manage at most one firm, and the
amount of investment is fixed at F.  This assumption implies that the employer’s technology is
subject not only to the minimum requirement, which implies the nonconvexity, but also to
diminishing returns.  Some readers might think that that this assumption of diminishing returns is
responsible for the rise of class societies. One might reason that, without diminishing returns, the
rich would invest more and operate many firms, until their labor demand would drive up the
wage rate so much that the poor workers can catch up with the rich.  In this section, we allow the
employers to make variable investment with constant returns to scale, except that they must
satisfy the minimum requirement for the investment, and show that the main results obtained in
the basic model would carry over.  Thus, what is essential is the nonconvexity of investment, not
diminishing returns.Class  Societies
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Let us go back to the model of section, and modify that model by assuming that, by
investing Kt  F units of the numeraire good and employing Nt units of labor at the beginning of
period, (Nt, Kt) units of the numeraire good become available at the end of period.  It is
assumed that  satisfies the standard properties of constant-returns to scale production functions
for Kt  F.  If Kt < F, (Nt, Kt) = 0.  Let kt  Kt/F, nt  Nt/kt, and (nt)  (nt, F).  Then, for kt 
1, MaxN{(N, K)  vN} = Maxn{(n)  vn}k = {(n(v))  vn(v)}k = (v)k, where n(v) and (v)
are defined as before.  Here, k is the scale of operation chosen by the employer, defined as the
investment measured in multiples of F, and (v) is the equilibrium profit per unit of operation,
which is independent of k, except that k must be greater than one.  (One possible interpretation is
that k is the number of firms (or factories) run by an agent, and the integer constraint is ignored
for k greater than one.)
In the previous models, it was assumed that the employer’s earning comes solely from
operating a firm.  In other words, one cannot be an employer and a worker at the same time.  If
we were to make the same assumption here, the lost wage income would be the fixed cost of
being an employer, independent of the scale of operation, which introduces increasing returns to
scale and leads to the nonexistence of the steady states.  This is a nuisance that we want to avoid.
Hence, in this section, we allow the employers to work as well.  Nevertheless, we shall call only
the agent who does not become an employer “a worker” and the agent who does not will be
called “an employer,” despite that the latter also supplies labor.
Although the technology now allows the agents to invest as much as possible, they may
not be able to do so, because of the borrowing constraint.  To invest by kt, the agent who
inherited wt needs to borrow by ktF  wt.  The agent, however, could pledge only up to a fraction
of the gross profit, 
(vt)kt.  Knowing this, the lender would lend only up to 
(vt)kt/r.
Therefore, to invest by kt, the agent needs to have wt  ktF  
(vt)kt/r or
(19) wt  [F  
(vt)/r]kt = C(vt)kt,
where C(vt)  F  
(vt)/r.  Subject to the borrowing constraint (19), the agent chooses kt to
maximize the end-of-the-period wealth,
vt + (vt)kt  r(ktF  wt) = vt + rwt  + ((vt)  rF)kt if  kt  1
(20)Class  Societies
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vt + rwt  if  0  	 kt < 1.
The labor demand is then equal to n(vt)kt.
The wage rate adjusts to keep the balance between the labor demand and the labor supply.
It is easy to see that the equilibrium wage rate satisfies C(vt) >  0 and vt 	 V, where V is now
defined by (V)  rF.  To see this, suppose vt > V.  Then, (vt) < rF so that (20) is maximized at
kt = 0.  All the agents prefer being workers, and not investing.  Hence, the labor demand would
be zero, and there is an excess supply of labor.  Suppose now C(vt) 	 0, which implies (vt) 
rF/
 > rF.  Then, (20) is strictly increasing in kt  1, while the borrowing constraint (19) is not
binding.  Hence, the agents would invest by an infinite amount and the labor demand would be
infinite.  Therefore, the equilibrium wage rate must adjust to satisfy 0 < C(vt) 	 C(V).
Note that vt 	 V may still be interpreted as the profitability constraint for becoming an
employer, although the definition of V is now given by (V)  rF, not by (V)  V  rF.  This is
due to the change in the assumption made earlier, i.e., an agent supplies one unit of labor even as
an employer. Note also that V may still be interpreted as the “fair” wage rate, because it is the
wage rate that equalizes the net earnings of the employer and the worker.  To make sure that the
employers indeed employ more labor than they can supply themselves, it is necessary to impose
the following restriction:
(A4) (1) > V.
This ensures that n(vt)  n(V) > 1.
Having established that 0 < C(vt) 	 C(V) in equilibrium, let us now consider the optimal
investment behavior in this range.  First, consider the case, 0 < C(vt) < C(V), or rF < (vt) < rF/
.
Then, (20) is strictly increasing in kt  1, so that every agent wants to invest as much as possible.
If wt  C(vt), the agent invests until the borrowing constraint is binding, i.e., kt = wt/C(vt)  1. If
wt < C(vt), then the agent cannot meet the minimum requirement, so that kt = 0.  This can be
summarized as
wt /C(vt)i f  w t  C(vt)
(21) kt =
0i f  w t < C(vt).Class  Societies
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Now, consider the case, (vt) = rF, or vt = V.  Then, (20) is equal to V + rwt for kt = 0 and
for all kt  1, while 0 < kt < 1 is strictly dominated. All the agents are hence indifferent between
kt = 0 and for all kt  1.  Since the borrowing constraint is now wt  C(V)kt,
{0, [1, wt /C(V)]} if wt  C(V)
(22) kt
= 0 if wt < C(V).
The labor demand is equal to n(vt)kt, where kt is given by (21) or (22).  Hence, the











   1 ;  0 < C(vt) 	 C(V),
where the first inequality may be strict either when Gt jumps at C(vt) or when vt = V.  Equation
(23) is illustrated in Figure 7.  The aggregate labor supply is now indicated by the vertical line at
one, because each agent, including the rich employer, supplies one unit of labor.  The downward-
sloping curve is the aggregate labor demand.  Note that a higher wage rate reduces the aggregate
labor demand for three reasons.  First, it reduces the labor demand per unit of operation (n(vt) is
decreasing in vt).  Second, it reduces the profit per unit of operation ((vt) is decreasing in vt),
which tightens the borrowing constraint (C(vt) is increasing in vt), forcing the employer to
operate at a smaller scale, at wt/C(vt).  Third, with a tighter borrowing constraint, less agents are
able to meet the minimum investment requirement to become employers.  Note that, if Gt has a
mass point at C(vt), a positive measure of the agents can meet the minimum requirement at C(vt),
which causes the aggregate labor demand to jump at C(vt), as illustrated by the flat segment of
the demand curve.  If the vertical line intersects at the flat segment, there would be an
equilibrium credit rationing.  If it intersects at the downward sloping part of the labor demand
curve, as indicated in Figure 7, then there is no credit rationing.  As before, we ignore this
possibility of equilibrium credit rationing, as it never happens in a steady state.
From (20)-(22), the dynamics of the household can be expressed by
vt + [C(V)/C(vt)][(vt)/(V)](r)wt if  wt  C(vt)
(24) wt+1 =Class  Societies
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vt + (r)wt  if  wt < C(vt),
which is illustrated by Figure 8.  As in the basic model, the map (24) jumps at C(vt) when vt < V.
Unlike in the basic model, the slope of the map is strictly higher above C(vt) than below C(vt),
when vt < V.  The wealth, when in the hands of the rich, earns the gross rate of return,
[C(V)/C(vt)][(vt)/(V)]r, which is strictly greater than r.  The intuition behind this is easy to
grasp.  When vt < V, it is not only profitable to invest to become an employer.  It is also
profitable to invest more and operate the firm at a larger scale. Having a higher amount of wealth
above C(vt) allows the rich to invest more by easing the borrowing constraint.  This leverage
effect allows the rich employers to earn higher returns on their wealth than the poor workers.
Indeed, for a sufficiently low wage rate, the leverage effect is so strong that the slope of the map
above C(vt) can be greater than one.  This does not mean, however, that the rich’s wealth can
grow unbounded.  The wealth of the rich will eventually stop growing, because a wealth
accumulation by the rich will lead to a greater demand for labor, which will push up the wage
rate until the slope of the map becomes less than one.
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As before, the arrows indicate the effects of a higher wage rate, when vt < V. It raises the
threshold level of wealth, increases the wealth of the worker, and reduces the gross rate of return
on wealth owned by the rich.  The dashed line, wt+1 = (V + rwt), gives the dynamics of
household wealth when vt = V.
For a given distribution of wealth in each period, the labor market equilibrium condition
(23) determines the wage rate, vt, and then, from (24), one can obtain the wealth distribution in
the next period.  Thus, the equilibrium path of this economy can be solved for by applying (23)
and (24) iteratively.
It is easy to see that there are at most two types of the steady states in this economy.  The
first type is that the steady state, characterized by an equal distribution of wealth and v = V.
The condition for its existence is given by
w = V/(1r)  P(V)  C(V),
                                                                       
20In this respect, this dynamics is similar to the household wealth dynamics of the model in Matsuyama (2000).Class  Societies
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as the labor market equilibrium condition, (23), holds because the labor demand is given by
n(V)P(V)/C(V) > 1.  The second type is a continuum of steady states, characterized by two-point
distributions of wealth, and v = V.  The rich own
w
B
 = B(v)  v /{1[C(V)/C(v)][(v)/(V)](r)} < 
and the poor owns P(v).  The condition that the rich can meet the minimum investment
requirement and the poor cannot is given by B(v)  C(v) > P(v).  The labor market
equilibrium condition, (23), is (1X)n(v)B(v)/C(v) = 1, where X is the share of the poor
households.  Because 1  X = C(v)/n(v)B(v) 	 1/n(v) < 1/n(V) < 1, one can find X  (0,1)
that ensures the labor market equilibrium for each v.  Thus, the existence condition for this type
of steady states is simply
B(v)  C(v) > P(v).
Note that the existence condition of this type of the steady states imposes the lower bound on the
steady state wage rate, which is more stringent than the restriction, C(v) > 0;  it must be
sufficiently high to satisfy [C(V)/C(v)][(v)/(V)](r) < 1, which ensures that the rich’s wealth
would not grow unbounded.  Comparing across these steady states, a lower v means a higher
B(v), a lower P(v), and a higher X, so that these steady states can be ranked according to the
Lorenz criterion.  A lower steady state wage rate is thus associated with greater inequality.
A lower steady state wage rate is also associated with a smaller total surplus, TS  v +
(1X)((v)rF)k = v +(1X)((v)rF)B(v)/C(v), or equivalently, by the aggregate
wealth, AW  XP(v) + (1X)B(v) = [/(1r)]TS.  Simple algebra shows that TS = v +
((v)rF)/n(v) = [(n(v))rF]/n(v).  Hence, d(TS)/dv = n(v)[n(v)(n(v)) + rF 
(n(v))]/(n(v))
2 = n(v)[rF  (v)]/(n(v))
2, which is positive if v < V and zero if v = V.
Thus, when there are multiple steady states, the aggregate wealth and the total surplus is smaller
in a steady state with a lower v, i.e., in a steady state with greater inequality.
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Characterizing the condition for the co-existence of different types of steady states in the
parameter space is more involved than in the previous model, because one has to go through
more cases.   Indeed, it is as cumbersome as in the model of Matsuyama (2000), which also
                                                                       
21 In this respect, this model differs significantly from the model of Matsuyama (2000), whose aggregate wealth
dynamics is entirely independent of the wealth distribution dynamics.Class  Societies
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generates wealth distribution dynamics, where the rich earns higher return on their wealth than
the poor.  The main source of the complication is the variability of the gross rate of return earned
by the rich on their wealth.  This introduces additional cases, where all the steady states are
characterized by two-point distributions, and yet the share of the population that becomes the
rich, while strictly positive, can be arbitrarily close to zero.
22  Nevertheless, it can be done, in a
manner similar to Matsuyama (2000), and can be shown that the basic feature of the previous
model is preserved.  That is to say, a combination of a higher F and a smaller 
 implies the rise of
class societies, and a combination of a lower F and a higher 
 implies the fall of class societies.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a theoretical framework to understand the mechanisms behind
the rise and fall of class societies.  Under some configurations of the parameter values, the model
predicts the rise of class societies, where the population is separated into the rich bourgeoisie and
the poor proletariat in all the steady states, regardless of the initial distribution of wealth.  In
these steady states, the rich bourgeoisie maintain a high level of wealth, partially due to the cheap
labor supplied by the poor who, with their low level of wealth, have no choice but work for the
rich.  Under other configurations of the parameter values, the model predicts the fall of class
societies.  The rich’s demand for labor pushes up the wage rate so much that the workers escape
from the poverty, and the class distinction disappears in the long run, regardless of the initial
distribution of wealth. In this case, the wealth accumulation by the rich eventually trickles down
to the poor. As an application, the framework is used to examine the effects of self-employment.
Self-employment not only provides the poor with an alternative to working for the rich, but it
also provides the rich with an alternative to investing in the job creating project, which could
benefit the poor.  Due to this dual nature of self-employment, the effects of self-employment turn
out to be quite subtle.  Yet, within the present framework, it was possible to offer a complete
characterization of the steady states in the presence of self-employment.
Some readers might find it unsettling that, for the case where the model predicts the rise
of class societies, there is a continuum of steady states, each of which is characterized by a two-
                                                                       
22 This complication arises because B(v) may be unbounded for the range of the wage rates that satisfy the inequalityClass  Societies
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point distribution (or possibly a three-point distribution in the model with self-employment).
This feature of the model is, however, a mere artifact of the simplifying assumptions that all the
households are homogenous, except inherited wealth, and that there are no idiosyncratic shocks.
For example, if the ability of the agent as an employer, perhaps measured by F, the minimum
requirement of investment, is a random variable, there would be the unique ergodic distribution
of wealth.  If the model is extended to allow for such idiosyncratic shocks, however, we would
have to characterize the condition under which the ergodic distribution is unimodal or bimodal,
which may not be feasible analytically.
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Obviously, one can think of many ways in which the models can be extended.
Introducing long run growth is one.  In the above models, the minimum level of investment plays
a crucial role.  If the economy as a whole is growing over time, perhaps due to some exogenous
improvement in technology, and if the minimum level of investment is exogenously fixed, the
mechanism for the formation of class societies identified in this paper loses its power in the long
run.  On the other hand, if the engine of growth is endogenous technological change due to
investment, and if better technology requires a higher level of minimum investment, then long
run growth may never eliminate the class distinction.
The theoretical framework presented above, or some variations of it, should also be
useful for the policy analysis.  For example, in some cases, redistributing wealth from the rich
bourgeoisie to the poor proletariat, by introducing some forms of inheritance taxes, may not only
help the poor to escape from the poverty, but also have the effects of increasing the aggregate
wealth and the total surplus.  In other cases, it may push the economy into the poverty trap, by
reducing investment by the rich, which could help the poor workers by creating jobs.  It is hoped
that the present paper would stimulate further research on these issues.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
C(v) > P(v).
23Alternatively, this type of indeterminacy can be eliminated by introducing a continuum of job category, as in




i) This follows from the fact that (v) are V() are positive and decreasing functions and satisfy
(0) =  and V() = 0.









3) < 0.  From
L’Hospital’s Rule, (0) =  limx[(x)/x] =  limx (x) = 0.
iii) By definition, (v)  (n) nv, where the equality holds if and only if n = n(v).  Thus, by
setting v = V((





)), where the equality
holds if and only if /
 = n(V((
))).  This is equivalent to 
  ((
)), where the equality
holds if and only if 
 = 
c, where 
c is defined uniquely by  = 
cn(V((
c))).  By setting c =
(
c) and 
c = (c), this condition can be rewritten as  = (c)n(V(c)). Since ()n(V())
is strictly increasing in  with (
+)n(V(
+)) = 0 and ()n(V()) = n(0) = , 
+ < c < ,
from which 0 = (
+) < 
c = (c) < 1 = () follows.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
First, note that (5) can be written to V  rF  
(V), which is equivalent to 
  (rF).  Thus, (5)
fails under the condition of Proposition 2a) and is satisfied under the conditions of Propositions
2b) and 2c).  In particular, if 
 < (rF), the three curves intersect as shown in Figure 3a.  Next,
let us find the condition under which P(v) = v/(1r) and C(v) = F  
(v)/r are tangent
below V(rF).  Let z < V(rF) denote the point of tangency.  Then, z = rF  
(z) and  =  
(z)
= 
n(z).  This implies that rF = 
(z) + z = 






n(x) < n(V(rF)), or rF < (n(V(rF))) = (n(V(rF)))/n(V(rF)), which is equivalent to rF < c.
Thus, P(v) and C(v) are tangent below V(rF) if and only if (
) = rF < c.  Finally, note that
rP(v) = v is independent of rF and a higher rF moves up rC(v) = rF  
(v).  Since P(v) is
linear and C(v) is concave, this means that, if (
) < rF < c, P(v) and C(v) intersects twice as
shown in Figure 3b, and that, if rF 	 (
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1Figure 8: The Household Wealth Dynamics without Diminishing Returns
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